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The idea is that when we reboot, we zero out
memory written by processes that have the private
flag set (such as factotum and keyfs), and also
clear the secrmem pool, which contains TLS keys
and the state of the random number generator.
This is so the newly booted kernel or firmware
will not find these secret keys in memory.
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when we are panicing
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unlock()/iunlock():
we need to place the coherence() *before* "l->key = 0", so that any
stores that where done while holding the lock become observable
*before* other processors see the lock released.
cas()/tas():
place memory barrier before successfull return to prevent reordering.
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lock(), use uintptr intstead of long for pc values
change Proc.nlocks from Ref to int and just use normal increment and decrelemt
as done in erik quanstros 9atom.
It is not clear why we used atomic increment in the fist place as even if we
get preempted by interrupt and scheduled before we write back the incremented
value, it shouldnt be a problem and we'll just continue where we left off as
our process is the only one that can write to it.
Yoann Padioleau found that the Mach pointer Lock.m wasnt maintained
consistently for lock() vs canlock() and ilock(). Fixed.
Use uintptr instead of ulong for maxlockpc, maxilockpc and ilockpc debug variables.
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this change is in preparation for amd64. the systab calling
convention was also changed to return uintptr (as segattach
returns a pointer) and the arguments are now passed as
va_list which handles amd64 arguments properly (all arguments
are passed in 64bit quantities on the stack, tho the upper
part will not be initialized when the element is smaller
than 8 bytes).
this is partial. xalloc needs to be converted in the future.
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