ape: removing openssl

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 631 deletions

diff --git a/sys/src/ape/lib/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/sys/src/ape/lib/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 7690ed657..000000000
--- a/sys/src/ape/lib/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,631 +0,0 @@
-/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
-				const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
-				SSL_SESSION **psess);
-#endif
-
-SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
-	tls1_enc,
-	tls1_mac,
-	tls1_setup_key_block,
-	tls1_generate_master_secret,
-	tls1_change_cipher_state,
-	tls1_final_finish_mac,
-	TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
-	tls1_cert_verify_mac,
-	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
-	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
-	tls1_alert_code,
-	};
-
-long tls1_default_timeout(void)
-	{
-	/* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
-	 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
-	return(60*60*2);
-	}
-
-IMPLEMENT_tls1_meth_func(tlsv1_base_method,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			ssl_undefined_function,
-			ssl_bad_method)
-
-int tls1_new(SSL *s)
-	{
-	if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
-	s->method->ssl_clear(s);
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-void tls1_free(SSL *s)
-	{
-	ssl3_free(s);
-	}
-
-void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
-	{
-	ssl3_clear(s);
-	s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
-	}
-
-#if 0
-long tls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, char *parg)
-	{
-	return(0);
-	}
-
-long tls1_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void *(*fp)())
-	{
-	return(0);
-	}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
-	{
-	int extdatalen=0;
-	unsigned char *ret = p;
-
-	ret+=2;
-
-	if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
-
- 	if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
-		{ 
-		/* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
-		unsigned long size_str;
-		long lenmax; 
-
-		/* check for enough space.
-		   4 for the servername type and entension length
-		   2 for servernamelist length
-		   1 for the hostname type
-		   2 for hostname length
-		   + hostname length 
-		*/
-		   
-		if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 
-		|| (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) 
-			return NULL;
-			
-		/* extension type and length */
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 
-		s2n(size_str+5,ret);
-		
-		/* length of servername list */
-		s2n(size_str+3,ret);
-	
-		/* hostname type, length and hostname */
-		*(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
-		s2n(size_str,ret);
-		memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
-		ret+=size_str;
-
-		}
-
-	if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
-		{
-		int ticklen;
-		if (s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
-			ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
-		else
-			ticklen = 0;
-		/* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
- 		 * rest for ticket
-  		 */
-		if (limit - ret - 4 - ticklen < 0)
-			return NULL;
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 
-		s2n(ticklen,ret);
-		if (ticklen)
-			{
-			memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
-			ret += ticklen;
-			}
-		}
-
-	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
-		return p;
-
-	s2n(extdatalen,p);
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
-	{
-	int extdatalen=0;
-	unsigned char *ret = p;
-
-	ret+=2;
-	if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
-
-	if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
-		{ 
-		if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) return NULL; 
-
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
-		s2n(0,ret);
-		}
-	
-	if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
-		&& !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 
-		{ 
-		if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) return NULL; 
-		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
-		s2n(0,ret);
-		}
-		
-	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
-		return p;
-
-	s2n(extdatalen,p);
-	return ret;
-	}
-
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
-	{
-	unsigned short type;
-	unsigned short size;
-	unsigned short len;
-	unsigned char *data = *p;
-	s->servername_done = 0;
-
-	if (data >= (d+n-2))
-		return 1;
-	n2s(data,len);
-
-	if (data > (d+n-len)) 
-		return 1;
-
-	while (data <= (d+n-4))
-		{
-		n2s(data,type);
-		n2s(data,size);
-
-		if (data+size > (d+n))
-	   		return 1;
-
-		if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
-			s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
-						s->tlsext_debug_arg);
-/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
-
-   - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
-   - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
-     in which case an fatal alert is generated.
-   - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
-   - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
-     to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 
-   - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 
-     it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 
-     Applications can control the behaviour.  They can at any time
-     set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
-     case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
-     a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
-     presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
-     the value of the Host: field. 
-   - Applications must  use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
-     if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
-     i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. 
-   - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 
-
-*/      
-
-		if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
-			{
-			unsigned char *sdata;
-			int servname_type;
-			int dsize; 
-		
-			if (size < 2) 
-				{
-				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			n2s(data,dsize);  
-			size -= 2;
-			if (dsize > size  ) 
-				{
-				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				} 
-
-			sdata = data;
-			while (dsize > 3) 
-				{
-	 			servname_type = *(sdata++); 
-				n2s(sdata,len);
-				dsize -= 3;
-
-				if (len > dsize) 
-					{
-					*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-					return 0;
-					}
-				if (s->servername_done == 0)
-				switch (servname_type)
-					{
-				case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
-					if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
-						{
-						if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name || 
-							((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL))
-							{
-							*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-							return 0;
-							}
-						memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
-						s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
-						if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
-							OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
-							*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-							return 0;
-						}
-						s->servername_done = 1; 
-
-						}
-					else 
-						s->servername_done = strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 
-							&& strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
-					
-					break;
-
-				default:
-					break;
-					}
-				 
-				dsize -= len;
-				}
-			if (dsize != 0) 
-				{
-				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-
-			}
-		/* session ticket processed earlier */
-
-		data+=size;		
-		}
-
-	*p = data;
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
-	{
-	unsigned short type;
-	unsigned short size;
-	unsigned short len;  
-	unsigned char *data = *p;
-
-	int tlsext_servername = 0;
-
-	if (data >= (d+n-2))
-		return 1;
-
-	n2s(data,len);
-
-	while(data <= (d+n-4))
-		{
-		n2s(data,type);
-		n2s(data,size);
-
-		if (data+size > (d+n))
-	   		return 1;
-
-		if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
-			s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
-						s->tlsext_debug_arg);
-
-		if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
-			{
-			if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			tlsext_servername = 1;   
-			}
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
-			{
-			if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
-				|| (size > 0))
-				{
-				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
-			}
-
-		data+=size;		
-		}
-
-	if (data != d+n)
-		{
-		*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-		return 0;
-		}
-
-	if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
-		{
- 		if (s->tlsext_hostname)
-			{
-			if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
-				{
-				s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);	
-				if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
-					{
-					*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-					return 0;
-					}
-				}
-			else 
-				{
-				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-				return 0;
-				}
-			}
-		}
-
-	*p = data;
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
-	int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
-	if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 
-		ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-	else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 		
-		ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-
-	switch (ret)
-		{
-		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
-			return -1;
-
-		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
-			return 1; 
-					
-		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
-			s->servername_done=0;
-			default:
-		return 1;
-		}
-	}
-
-int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
-	{
-	int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
-	int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
-	if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 
-		ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-	else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 		
-		ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-
-	switch (ret)
-		{
-		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
-			return -1;
-
-		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
-			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
-			return 1; 
-					
-		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
-			s->servername_done=0;
-			default:
-		return 1;
-		}
-	}
-
-/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
- * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
- * session ticket extension at the same time.
- */
-
-int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
-				const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
-	{
-	/* Point after session ID in client hello */
-	const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
-	unsigned short i;
-	if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
-		return 1;
-	if (p >= limit)
-		return -1;
-	/* Skip past cipher list */
-	n2s(p, i);
-	p+= i;
-	if (p >= limit)
-		return -1;
-	/* Skip past compression algorithm list */
-	i = *(p++);
-	p += i;
-	if (p > limit)
-		return -1;
-	/* Now at start of extensions */
-	if ((p + 2) >= limit)
-		return 1;
-	n2s(p, i);
-	while ((p + 4) <= limit)
-		{
-		unsigned short type, size;
-		n2s(p, type);
-		n2s(p, size);
-		if (p + size > limit)
-			return 1;
-		if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
-			{
-			/* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will
- 			 * trigger a full handshake
- 			 */
-			if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
-				return 0;
-			/* If zero length not client will accept a ticket
- 			 * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
- 			 */
-			if (size == 0)
-				{
-				s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
-				return 0;	/* Cache miss */
-				}
-			return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
-									ret);
-			}
-		p += size;
-		}
-	return 1;
-	}
-
-static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
-				const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
-				SSL_SESSION **psess)
-	{
-	SSL_SESSION *sess;
-	unsigned char *sdec;
-	const unsigned char *p;
-	int slen, mlen;
-	unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-	HMAC_CTX hctx;
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
-	/* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
- 	 * integrity checks on ticket.
- 	 */
-	mlen = EVP_MD_size(tlsext_tick_md());
-	eticklen -= mlen;
-	/* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
-	if (eticklen < 48)
-		goto tickerr;
-	/* Check key name matches */
-	if (memcmp(etick, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
-		goto tickerr;
-	/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
-	HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
-	HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
-				tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
-	HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
-	HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
-	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-	if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
-		goto tickerr;
-	/* Set p to start of IV */
-	p = etick + 16;
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
-	/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
-	EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
-					s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, p);
-	/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
-	p += 16;
-	eticklen -= 32;
-	sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
-	if (!sdec)
-		{
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-		return -1;
-		}
-	EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
-	if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
-		goto tickerr;
-	slen += mlen;
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-	p = sdec;
-		
-	sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
-	OPENSSL_free(sdec);
-	if (sess)
-		{
-		/* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to
- 		 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
- 		 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
- 		 * as required by standard.
- 		 */
-		if (sesslen)
-			memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
-		sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
-		*psess = sess;
-		s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
-		return 1;
-		}
-	/* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to
- 	 * send a new ticket
- 	 */
-	tickerr:	
-	s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
-	return 0;
-	}
-
-#endif